Optimizing a Decision-Maker's Preferences with a Minimum Amount of Information by Bell, D.E.
Optimizing a Decision-Maker's 
Preferences with a Minimum 
Amount of Information
Bell, D.E.
IIASA Working Paper
WP-74-004
1974 
Bell, D.E. (1974) Optimizing a Decision-Maker's Preferences with a Minimum Amount of Information. IIASA Working 
Paper. WP-74-004 Copyright © 1974 by the author(s). http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/167/ 
Working Papers on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
OPTIMIZING A DECISION MAKER'S PREFERENCES
WITH A MINIMUM AMOUNT OF INFORMATION
D. E. Bell
January 1974
Working Papers are not intended for
distribution outside of IIASA, and
are solely for discussion and infor-
mation purposes. The views expressed
are those of the author, and do not
necessarily reflect those of IIASA.
WP-74-4

Optimizing a Decision Maker's Preferences
With a Minimum Amount of Information
David E. Bell
1. Outline
Consider the linear program
max cx
x£X
where X = {xlAx = b, x ｾ O} and where the objective function
(1)
represents the preferences of a decision maker over the set of
alternatives. We assume that some information I has been obtained
about his preferences which is insufficient to define the object-
ive coefficients exactly. Hence, there is a set C(I) of possible
vectors each of which is consistent with the known information.
One element of C(I) is "correct", but we, the optimizers, do not
know which.
It is evident that if for some x£X, x is optimal in (1) for
all cEC(I), then it is unnecessary to know which element of C(I)
is correct since they all give the same answer. The aim here is
to obtain the minimum amount of information required from a
decision maker in order to find his best alternative in a given
problem.
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2. Obtaining Correct Information
,A criticism of modern decision analysis is that often a.
decision maker is required to give sophisticated answers in
matters he may not understand. Few people have a good feeling
for probability (how "likely" is one chance in fifty?), and
much of the income of analysts arises precisely because people
are not generally good at coming to precise conclusions.
Consider the following three questions dealing with a
four attribute problem:
a) Which state do you prefer, (0,2,9,3) or (5,1,6,1)1
b) If the value of (0,0,0,0) is considered to be zero
and that of (1,1,1,1) to be one, what would you
consider to be the value of (1,2,3,4)1
c) For what value of e does (2,3,4,5) become
indifferent to (8,0,0,6)?
Of these I would consider b) to require the most judgement on
the part of the decision maker and a) the least. Question c)
requires repeated applications of a) until 8 converges to some
answer. Note that the "answer space" for b) and c) is infinite
but for a) it is finite (of size two).
Of course the answer to question b) will do most to restrict
the size of the set C(I) and a) the least. If the decision maker
can make sophisticated judgements, all well and good. In what
follows he will only be required to give a preference ordering
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amongst two states, that is, answer question a). It will be
assumed that when given a choice between two states, he will
either
(i) prefer one to the other,
(ii) be indifferent,
(iii) not be sure,
but, for the time being, we will exclude (iii).
3. The Approach
We will start by assuming an initial ｱ ｵ ｾ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｴ ｹ of information
I is already known. For example, by making pairwise comparisons,
the decision maker could order a list of states from best to
worst. Preferences x > y, x - yare imposed as restrictions
on the coefficients of c by imposing the constraints cx > cy and
cx = cy as appropriate.
Lemma 1
Proof
C(l) is a cone.
Substitution for c by AC for any A > 0 does not affect
the validity of ordering relations.
It will be useful later to have C(l) as a bounded set,
which may be achieved by constraining
2Lc. = 11
but for the linear programming example with which most of this
II
paper deals, it is better to have a linear constraint. By pairwise
comparisons, it is possible to determine for each i whether
c. > 0 or c. < 0 (is an attribute good or bad?) and let O. = +11.- 1. 1.
if c. > 0, O. = -1 if c. < O. The constraints
1. - 1. 1.
4.
n
r
i=l
15.c. = 1
1. 1.
, O.c. > 0
1. 1.
are thus linear and make C(I) bounded. We will assume that
15. = +1 for all i since re-definition of the variables can
1.
make this so.
Now consider the space of solutions X. Let S be the set
of possible solutions to problem (1) for all possible CIS. In
this case we may take S to be the set of extreme points of X.
Now define the map
rb C(I) -+- S
where rb(c) is the optimal basic solution to
max cx
xe:X
assumed to be unique.
Lemma 2 The function z(c) = crb(c) is convex.
Proof
< ! max clx + ! max c 2x
xe:X xe:X
max (!c I + !c 2 )x
xe:X
II
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There is only a problem if
IQS(C(I))I > I ,
in which case, alternative optima exist. We seek a "minimal"
set of information J for which
IQS (C( IUJ ) ) I = I
The set J will be regarded as minimal if it requires the fewest
subsequent pairwise comparisons to be made by the decision maker.
4. Details
The line of attack taken here will be to find any two
elements of QS(C(I)), if two exist, and ask the decision maker to
compare them.
Lemma 3 If xl ,x2 e: QS(C(I)) and the decision maker subsequently
decides that xl > x2 , the constraint cxl > cx2 is added to I,
then x2 t QS(C(I)).
Proof If x2 £ 6(C(I)), then there exists some c£C(I) such that
6 .
in particular
- 2
cx > cx
- 2 Icx > cx
for all x£X
This contradicts the new constraint. II
The point of lemma 3 is that the new cut removes all those
c£C(I) which gave x2 as the optimum. This cut may well remove
many other elements of C(I) as well as 6- I (x2 ). This paper will
not throw any light on the question of which two elements of
6(C(I)) it is "best" to present to the decision maker. Remember
that beforehand it is not known whether he will answer xl > x2 ,
2 I I 2
x > x , or x - x. The problem that is addressed here is that
of finding any two different elements of 0(C(I)).
Finding one is simple: choose any c£C(I) (phase I L.P.
procedure perhaps), then solve
max cx
x£X
to find 6(c). The question now is, how to find another.
One sure method, which it seems will have to be used when
testing for optimality, is to take the nonbasic price coefficients
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which are non-positive on the set 0- l (0(c)) and test to see
if any may be made positive on C(I). That is, solve up to
n - m of the L.P. problems
If any of these have positive objective values, then that
solution c· t 6- l (0(C)) and the solution of
max c·x
XEX
(2)
will produce a second element of ｾ Ｈ ｃ Ｈ ｉ Ｉ Ｉ Ｎ If none of (2) produce
positive solutions, then 6(c) is the required optimal solution.
Whilst solving (n - m) versions of (2) may not be impossible,
faster methods may be available, though not assured of success.
Consider the following two problems, where z(c) = C0(C)
z(c·) = max z(c)
cEC(I)
z(c.) = min z(c)
cEC(I)
The idea is that these two solutions have intuitively a good
chance of satisfying ｾ Ｈ ｣ ﾷ Ｉ ¢ ｾＨ｣ＮＩＮ
(4)
Lemma 4 Two elements of ｾ Ｈ ｃ Ｈ ｉ Ｉ Ｉ may be found after solving
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three linear programs or it is shown that ｾ Ｈ ｣ Ｎ Ｉ = ｾＨ｣ﾷＩ after
solving only two linear programs.
Proof Assume, for the moment, that C(I) may be defined by
Dc > 0
-
rc. = 11
C . > 01 -
The only subterfuge here is that some of the strict inequalities
have been replaced by non-strict inequalities. This point will
be revived later.
Now z(c) = max cx
xe:X
or taking the dual,
z (c) = min lTb
s.t. lTA > c
so that z(c.) = min z(c) = min lTb
ce:C(I)
s.t. lTA > c
-
Dc > 0
-
rc. = 11
C > 0
-
Hence (4) may be solved by one linear program.
Now consider the solution, c*, of
max c rI>(c*)
ce:C(I)
If ｾ Ｈ ｣ Ｊ Ｉ = rI>(c*), then this will be clear since
9.
(6)
will be non-positive. If (6) has some positive elements, then
max c*x
xe:X
will provide ｾ Ｈ ｣ Ｊ Ｉ Ｎ
Even if ｾ Ｈ ｣ Ｊ Ｉ = rI>(c*) , there remains another chance.
II
Lemma 5 If C(A) = c* + A(C* - c*) is feasible for some
A > 1, then
Proof By definition of c*,
,
but
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and hence 0(C.) ｾ 0(C(A))
To summarize, the only case which fails is if for some
c*x > C0(C) > c*x for all c€C(I)
II
and c* is extreme in C(I). Of course, there are other arbitrary
ways of findine a c£C(I) to generate a 0(C). Computational
experience may suggest a better approach.
5. Variations
This section just mentions the problems of convertinr,
constraints cx > cy into cx ｾ cy and and answers such as "I'm
not sure".
By introducing a small coefficient £, cx > cy may be written
as cx > cy + £ and "I'm not sure" may be expressed as
cx + E > cy > cx - £
where in this case £ is large enough to be accurate. An
interesting choice of c£C(I) might be
max E
s.t. Dc > E 1
-
LC. = 1l
C > 0
-
which maximizes the minimum "gap" between states.
6. Generalizations
This general approach of not tying down the objective
function is only suitable for finding exact solutions if the
solution space S is finite.
The general problem
11.
max u(x., ... ,x)
l n
g(x) < 0
is different in that respect. However, this technique is still
useful when the solution space is {Reject, Accept} for some
proposal. If the set of possible u's is U(I), then when
min u(Proposal) > 0
uEU(I)
the proposal may be accepted, or when
max u(Proposal) < 0
uEU(I)
it may be rejected.
7. Summary
This paper has considered a situation in which
1) The decision maker can make preference
orderings but not accurate value
jUdgements,
2) Computer time is less valuable than
the decision makers time.
Variations exist for all other combinations of circumstances;
the object here was merely to give an example.
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